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Liberty! ‘No concept has been used in a greater variety of meanings, and struck the 
minds in so many ways’, noted Montesquieu in his Esprit des Lois, published in 
1748.1 In 1994/95, a theme group at NIAS studied, among other themes, the use of 
this concept in Dutch history. I will not address this issue now as a historian, even 
less as an intellectual historian, but simply as a humanist. As it appears, Western 
societies are nowadays overwhelmed by a great variety of conflicting claims to 
personal liberty. In this lecture, I will first try to make a brief inventory of the current 
issues. Then I will discuss the arguments put forward in the ongoing debate on the 
contested clothing of some Muslim women. In a third part I will search for the origins 
of the concepts of liberty in Western Europe. The fourth section will provide a case 
study showing how these concepts have been re-mediated over time. In the fifth act, I 
hope to come to some conclusions. 
 
Current challenges 
Academics as we are, the concept of academic freedom is the one that concerns us 
directly. It refers to the freedom to choose the theme and the method of one’s 
research, and to speak publicly about the findings. The general expectation is that a 
scholar becomes most creative under conditions of freedom. We all highly value this 
freedom, which is far from self-evident, as ideological or allegedly managerial 
motives – which are equally ideological although disguised under a veil of rationality 
- continue to be used to limit some forms of curiosity-driven or socially required 
research. Institutes for Advanced Study are the apex of academic freedom, as fellows 
are left entirely free to carry out their own research. The only limitations are the self-
imposed forms of collaboration as in the theme groups. There, in a purely imaginary 
hypothesis, some tension may arise between the personal freedom to work at one’s 
own rhythm and along one’s personal lines of thought, and the common good of 
attaining a higher level of insights thanks to the contribution to a common scheme. 
These elementary observations provide us already with three fundamental 
dimensions of the concept of liberty. A fellow enjoys positive liberty in the sense that 
he is free to do what, how much and when he wants, and to deliver the results in the 
way he chooses himself. A fellow also enjoys negative liberty: he is protected against 
external interference which might distract him from his self-chosen seclusion. 
Modern media offer lots of temptations to disrupt the breeding researcher’s 
concentration, but it remains up to the fellow’s free will to accept or resist these, for 
the common good. Restrictions are obvious within a theme group: there the freedom 
is limited by the requirements of collaboration. In that way, the closest, and even self-
chosen colleagues reduce each participant’s liberty. The liberty of each member may 
come into conflict with that of the others – a phenomenon which is typical for any 
communal life. One person’s liberty may become detrimental for another’s liberty. 
How to chose between countervailing liberties? 
In The Netherlands, freedom is currently associated with the commemorations of the 
liberation from the Nazi occupation, each year held on 5 May. In 2010, the 65th 
commemoration received special attention. In Amsterdam, a ‘Great Freedom 
Contest’ included a lecture, debates and selected music about ‘freedom, liberation 
and freedombattle’. The general theme reads as follows: ‘How free is Amsterdam in 
the year 2010? Where are the boundaries and how to preserve our freedom in a city 
 where all kinds of interests are clashing and liberties are being fought for by the 
square metre?’ This year, Leiden University commemorates the 87th lustrum of its 
foundation as the Praesidium Libertatis (The bulwark of liberty), in 1575, after the 
withdrawal of the troops of the Spanish army. On this occasion, the University and 
the City, whose motto is Haec libertatis ergo (This for the sake of liberty), took the 
initiative for a yearly Freedom Lecture, the first to be held on 18 June 2010 by 
Salman Rushdie. The lecture series was created to emphasise the importance of 
freedom for science and democracy, and especially the freedom of speech.  
These initiatives were taken in a general climate in which the freedom of expression 
is under discussion. In April 2010, from which month date all the cases I will 
mention here, the High Court sentenced that a political party established in 1918 on 
the basis of orthodox reformed principles, the Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij,  is 
not entitled to exclude women from their constitutional passive voting right. After 
studying this case during seven years, the Court urged the government to enable 
women to be named on the poll lists of that party. Such measures not having been 
designed yet, this implies that the national elections on 11 June 2010 will still infringe 
the Constitution and the UN ‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women’, agreed upon in 1979 and ratified by The 
Netherlands in 1991. Article 7 stipulates that ‘states under the Convention have to 
take adequate measures to ban discrimination against women in the political and 
public life.’ Women belonging to that political and religious orientation claim that 
they don’t wish to be eligible. This argument is ethically and constitutionally 
unacceptable, as it is unlawful to waive fundamental human rights. It is interestingly 
similar to the argument used by some defendants of various forms of discrimination 
against women in Islamic communities, to which I will come back later.  
In a different domain, only a few years ago, a reverend was acquitted in appeal for a 
charge of offending homosexuals, as in a daily newspaper he had called their 
orientation a ‘dirty and sordid sin’. He was acquitted on the ground of his ‘firm belief 
in the word of God’, with a reference to Leviticus 18:22.2 This protection of the 
freedom of speech opens the way for many offences against all kinds of specific 
groups. The Partij voor Vrijheid (Party for Freedom), and especially its leader, uses 
its name and constitutional freedom of speech to carry on a rough battle against 
immigrants, and particularly against Islam. He calls the Qu’ran a ‘fascist’ book which 
should be prohibited and banished. He is now under trial on charges of engaging in 
hate speech and inciting to violence. In the last elections for the European 
Parliament, this party won four of the 25 seats. The Netherlands until recently 
cherished the self-image of being the guiding nation of the world, ethically and even 
in the sphere of social and economic relations. Nowadays, some liberties, guaranteed 
in the constitution, the European Treaty for Human Rights and other international 
treaties, are under vehement discussion. Whose liberty has to prevail? 
The Freiheitliche Partei Österrreichs, established in 1956, which participated in the 
federal government for some years since 2000, had already demonstrated how 
campaigns against immigrants could be launched under that label of freedom. An 
opinion poll showed in April 2010 that 71 percent of the Austrians consider Islam to 
be incompatible with the Western concepts of democracy, freedom and toleration. 
They think that Muslims don’t adapt themselves ‘to the lifestyle of the Austrian 
community’, and 54 percent of the interviewees see Islam as a threat for the Western 
way of life.3 In the elections held in Hungary in April 2010, the party Jobbik obtained 
16.7 percent of the votes. This party openly fosters hatred against foreigners, 
especially Rumanians, Gypsies and Jews. Last year, adherents of this party, dressed 
in the colours of the Hungarian fascist movement during the Second World War, 
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 launched attacks against Gypsies, including setting a house to fire and killing a father 
and his son during their flight. In most Western countries all this would be a basis for 
prosecution. A Belgian Member of Parliament was convicted for offending migrants: 
the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg denied him for ten years the use 
of his political rights. However, in the Hungarian Parliament a two-third majority is 
now held by a firmly nationalist party. Hungary epitomises feelings of insecurity 
which are only partially based on facts but magnified by media and populist 
politicians. Such an atmosphere, including the labelling of scapegoats, may lead to 
serious derogations from fundamental rights and liberties. 
All over Europe, diffuse feelings of anxiety are focused on the growing numbers and 
the increasing visibility of Muslims. These feelings may have been acerbated by 
international terrorism, and, on a more structural level, by partial integration of the 
immigrants. That led to discrimination and, as a reaction, it provoked aggressive 
behaviour of youngsters. It is true that integration of migrants in the labour force is 
lagging behind, due to social and ethnic, rather than religious factors. Migrants’ 
children, especially boys, generally achieve weaker results at school. The percentage 
of unemployed young migrants is relatively high. Around ten percent of the boys is 
hanging around in the streets and gets involved in all kinds of bands. Some of these 
engage in various criminal acts. Confrontations with the police are spiralling as they 
give a ‘kick’, and an opportunity to show macho behaviour. Policemen are not always 
free from racist reflexes themselves, which adds to the hatred. This reciprocal image 
of an enemy leads to street fights in the banlieux, which, thanks to the blowing up by 
the cameras, become the tournament fields where honour is to be won under the 
watching eye of the spectators. Populist political parties canalise the feelings of 
unrest, but the solutions they propose only aggravate the tensions. They use their 
democratic rights to reduce by force the liberties of other citizens, while mediation, 
communication and education proved to be the more successful approaches. 
A striking case is the referendum against building minarets for a mosque in 
Switzerland. Why should this slender construction harm the beauty of the landscape 
more than a traditional bell tower? Even trickier are the intentions of the French 
government and the nearly unanimous Belgian Parliament to forbid veils covering 
the face in the public space, for the sake of security. The Danish Prime Minister 
declared that ‘There is no place for the burqa and the niqaab in Danish society. They 
are symbols of a vision on women and mankind against which we are firmly 
opposed.’4 The question under debate in this issue is who is discriminating whom, 
and on which grounds. It is true that the proposed laws are targeting the common 
criminal’s balaclava just as much as the burqa and the niqaab, under the overall 
concern for security. In Nantes, a French woman who converted to Islam was fined 
for ‘driving in uncomfortable circumstances’, which referred to her niqaab. The affair 
became an issue in the national press as her partner, a naturalised Algerian, appeared 
to be a polygamist entertaining four wives and twelve children living on fraudulent 
social allowances. In France, some 1900 women are thought to wear such clothes, 
two-thirds of whom are French citizens and 90 percent is younger than 40.5 This 
share, 3 in 100,000, is so low that one may wonder why there is a problem. Aren’t 
Western societies obsessively staring at symbols by which small minorities are 
marking their collective identities, while these are not shared by the vast majority of 
their ethnic group? 
On the other hand, Western societies rightly want to defend their own values, 
including the security of persons and their property, toleration and the freedom of 
expression. But how far can one go in the proclamation of one’s values without 
abusing the liberty of expression? Where may free speech degenerate into 
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 provocation and offence? On 31 March 2010, the Anglo-Dutch writer Benno Barnard 
intended to deliver a lecture at the University of Antwerp. It was announced under 
the title in Dutch ‘Long live God, away with Allah’. Some forty radical Muslims, 
spurred by the website sharia4belgium, prevented this lecture to be held. Nine days 
later, a court adjudicated the City’s claim that ‘each infringement of the freedom of 
expression, or of the laws against discrimination and terrorism’ should be fined by € 
25,000.6 That may be justified, but was it wise for an internationally renowned 
author to hurt the religious feelings of Muslims if one has the intention to contribute 
meaningfully to the public debate? The European Court of Human Rights stated that 
especially politicians need to enjoy greater ‘freedom to address issues in ways that 
others may find provocative, shocking or disturbing, given their special role in public 
debate and democratic deliberation’. This implies, however, their responsibility to 
protect and enable the exercise of the freedom of others. ‘Freedom of speech is at 
issue when a contribution has the potential of being disruptive, shocking, 
provocative, or offensive.’7 Opinion leaders in general, including artists, have to be 
aware that they might make a greater contribution to our society by showing respect 
that keeps people from harming others, especially those in a weaker position. 
Personal liberties are under pressure in many parts of the Western world, and from 
various sides. The state Israel takes the liberty to kill opponents everywhere in the 
world, without any form of process. However, these persons see themselves as 
fighting for the freedom of their people, against a foreign and oppressive military 
occupation. In the territories Israel occupies against international law and against 
scores of UN resolutions, it takes the liberty of using disproportional and unspecified 
violence against civilians and to bring the whole population of Gaza to starvation by 
cutting the area off and even preventing fishermen to go on sea. That sea is heavily 
polluted anyhow, by lack of means to rebuild an adequate infrastructure.8 Does the 
right of Israelis to live safely within their own borders justify such outrageous 
violations of humanitarian law, and to deprive a whole population of the most 
essential freedoms and even necessities, lasting now for over half a century? The 
chair of the UN fact-finding mission on the Gaza war in 2008/09, former NIAS 
Fellow Justice Richard Goldstone, whose report has been endorsed by the UN 
Human Rights Council, the UN General Assembly and the European Parliament, 
became the victim of the most horrible personal vituperations by, among others, the 
South African Zionist Federation. These organisations went as far as to threaten to 
disturb the celebration of the bar mitswa ceremony for Goldstone’s grandson in 
Johannesburg, if he would attend that important religious rite de passage. By using 
such outrage against the personal liberty of an internationally highly esteemed judge, 
it is obvious that these people lost all feeling for human rights, as they are valued in 
the Western world. 
 
Fundamental Rights and Symbols 
As the dress code of Muslim women has recently been pushed on the political agenda 
in several West-European countries, the question arises which values are at stake, 
and whose liberty is under threat. We already noted that, at least in France, 90 
percent of the women wearing face-covering veils, are younger than 40. This 
demonstrates that the issue is not connected with the traditions of the first 
generations of migrants. Defendants of the hidjab, the burqa or the niqaab currently 
claim that the Qu’ran imposed this type of dress. This allegation would bring the 
whole issue under the protection of the fundamental freedom of religion or 
philosophical faith, as guaranteed by in article 9 of the European Treaty for Human 
Rights, dating from 1950, which includes ‘the expression in cults, education, in the 
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 practical application and in the observation of commands and prescriptions’. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, agreed upon by the United Nations in 1948, 
formulated these rights in the articles 18 and 19 as follows: 
 
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance.  
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.’  
 
In many countries of the Third World, the Universal Declaration has in the mean 
time been qualified as a product typical for Western societies and therefore not 
directly applicable to other cultures. In 1990, the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference which now counts 56 member states, issued the ‘Cairo Declaration of 
Human Rights in Islam’ which subjects all the rights and freedoms in the Universal 
Declaration to the Islamic Shari’ah. ‘The Islamic Shari’ah is the only source of 
reference for the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration.’ 
(art. 24 and 25) This implies, that Islamic countries don’t accept the Universal 
Declaration nor the European Human Rights as such. In the course of its historicy, 
the Muslim World did not develop the idea of separation of religious and secular 
authority, as it occurred in Western Europe. Nor did it have a clerical hierarchy 
which prescribed the unique orthodox interpretation of the holy book. Instead, 
various schools derived their authority from a great master. As a consequence, the 
religious prescriptions have been interpreted in very different ways through the 
centuries and countries. The reference to ‘the Islamic Shari’ah’ leaves the Muslims 
thus with a variety of interpretations.9   
The scarce references about the proper dress in the Qu’ran concern only women; they 
don’t mention the command to cover the face, the hair or the neck. Concrete 
prescriptions about types of clothes fail entirely. The main concern is that a religious 
woman should ‘protect her private parts’ and cover her bosom with a veil, ‘apart from 
what is apparent’ and normally visible. Women should ‘draw their cloaks around 
them’ in order to be identifiable and not to be harassed.10 What was considered as 
‘normality’ evidently depended on the climatic and geographical conditions, and thus 
was very divers. Later authorities are often contradictory and disputed. So, 
allegations to the Qu’ran in defence of any particular type of clothing only show the 
defendant’s ignorance. Further, it should be noted that the Qu’ran admits that males 
tend to harass women, but requires women to protect their chastity. These attitudes 
and norms fit well in the patriarchal stateless societies of Arabia in the seventh 
century. 
From the twelfth to the nineteenth centuries, most traditional schools of Islamic 
thought in Northern Africa prescribed clothing covering the whole face, air and neck, 
but in Turkey, Iran and Moghul India the sensuality of the décolleté was highly 
appreciated. Lots of paintings demonstrate the cult of physical beauty of both sexes 
in these regions. It is therefore incorrect to consider any dress code as a general 
religious prescription in the Islamic world as a whole. Interestingly, in 1974 the 
conference of the united ulama’s in Riyad prescribed to reserve the niqaab 
exclusively to free women, to distinguish them from slaves and to protect them 
against harassment. Curiously enough, for these religious leaders male harassment 
had retained all its self-evidence since the seventh century, just as the availability of 
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 female slaves to meet the relentless male needs. Nevertheless, since the early 
twentieth century, in the more progressive regions women laid aside their veils, as a 
sign of their emancipation. It was the Iranian revolution in 1979 which launched a 
fundamentalist reaction. The chador and the hidjab became the imposed markers of 
the new order, re-inventing a tradition which does not go back to the text of the 
Qu’ran nor to the alleged texts of the prophet, and had never been observed in the 
whole Islamic world. 
It is probable that young girls nowadays choosing to cover their face, have not been 
well-informed about the varied traditions in Islam. If they think to make a religious 
statement by wearing a burka or a niqaab, they are grossly misled. They ought to be 
aware that the choice for the legal prescriptions of the Qu’ran would imply quite 
other rules such as the exclusively male liberties concerning polygamy, repudiation, 
lapidation and other physical punishments, arranged marriages, and the authority of 
brothers over sisters. And indeed, some fundamentalist groups in Western Europe, 
and particularly in the UK, are already on their way to impose such a Shari’ah within 
their segregated communities. The pressure to impose the ‘traditional’ female dress 
code would then just be an expression of the rejection of the Western culture in 
which they chose to live. Further steps already include claims for sexual segregation, 
which go in the opposite direction from the evolution towards gender equality 
Western societies went through in the last century. Universal suffrage, equal rights 
and treatment for both sexes in education and professional life, respect for the 
dignity of a female person, mixed education, sporting, swimming, and medical care, 
birth control, the right of abortion and other ethical issues: all these relatively recent 
achievements are so deeply-felt values in Western societies that attempts to turn 
these down touch a very sensitive cord. The UN ‘Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women’ of 1979 is a great text, but its observation is 
far from evident, as the case of the denial of passive voting rights for women in The 
Netherlands by the SGP reminds us. Feminists rightly point to the way we still have 
to go to really achieve equality in the distribution of social roles. Westerners should 
not accept expressions of lack of respect for women, such as the refusal of shaking 
hands, as a religious prescription. First, there is no such command in any general 
Islamic doctrine, and, second, secularised societies don’t have to accept behaviour 
they learned to ban as contradictory to human rights. 
If the relatively small groups of fundamentalists are not controlled, they will continue 
to contest Western science including the evolution theory, the historicity of the Shoah 
and the toleration of homosexuality. In all these respects, they claim liberties which 
are entirely opposed to fundamental developments in Western culture. Migrants 
coming from less developed regions in countries where the successive emancipation 
movements had a much weaker, if any, impact, have a hard time to catch up with this 
huge cultural gap. This difficulty adds up to their different linguistic and religious 
traditions. Many of them make admirable advances in this respect, but for a majority 
the challenge simply is too great. We have to respect that and help them to overcome 
their difficulties, which may well take several generations. The tiny minority, 
however, who choose to reject all but the material advantages of living in the West, 
should be aware that they will not be given the liberty to destroy the liberties our 
ancestors developed during centuries. Those who prefer the Shari’ah above Western 
Human Rights cannot appeal to our freedom of religion and expression. 
 
A Genealogy of Liberties 
Cultural transformations in most cases takes time as people don’t change ideas and 
values as they change clothes, and even a dressing code is a cultural expression, as we 
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 have seen. I would like to mention the main steps Europe needed to develop its 
current concepts of liberty. 
 
1. Freedom of speech, truth-finding in natural sciences as well as in good 
citizenship, these values were developed since the fifth century BCE in Athens. The 
agora was a place for public debate and sound deliberation, based on moral and 
juridical principles.11 Liberty was opposed to slavery, a social condition which 
remained undisputed, as was the restriction of liberties to male citizens only. 
2. The Roman Republic of the first century BCE further elaborated the civic rights 
and liberties, including the protection of private property and the right of political 
participation, the ius suffragii. The main contributions were the formulation of 
written law and the system of jurisdiction which were gradually extended to entire 
territories.12 
3. The Catholic Church grew as an institution within the structures of the late 
Roman Empire, and it inherited, among many other of its features, its legal 
framework. So, the Church protected its properties against interference by lay 
persons by claiming immunity rights. From the tenth century onwards, a stronger 
movement within the Church aimed at the reduction of the influence of lay 
authorities with regard to the appointment of members of the clergy and the 
management of its domains. Jurisdiction about church property and personnel, as 
well as concerning the holy sacraments administered, had to be reserved exclusively 
to ecclesiastical instances. This movement was labelled libertas ecclesie, the 
freedom of the Church, by which its negative freedom was meant, the autonomy 
vis-à-vis the laity. By extension, the Church strove at the limitation of the use of 
physical violence among Christians. It used its symbolic authority to impose 
periods during which, and spaces where violence had to be banned. Vulnerable, 
unarmed people such as clerics, travellers and peasants were thus ‘liberated’ from 
the often exorbitant use of physical violence by the aristocracy. 
4. The growth of cities and towns, starting in the Southern Europe in the tenth 
century and gradually spreading to the northern and eastern parts, was a decisive 
step towards the creation of spaces where particular liberties applied to its 
burghers. Citizens were free persons in the sense that they were not slaves, nor serfs 
who had to fulfil all kinds of duties and were bound to the land they had to 
cultivate. The larger and wealthier a city, the better it was capable to protect its 
citizens within and outside the walls which enclosed the privileged community. 
Urban liberties dealt with self-governance, the autonomy of legislation and 
jurisdiction, and safety for its travelling burghers. Urban liberties were negative, as 
they protected the burghers against violence and exaction by aristocrats as well as 
against the religious prescriptions which hampered the economic development they 
were pursuing. The liberties also were positive, as they enabled citizens to develop 
their specific way of life, and their systems of norms and values. Urban liberties 
were characteristically negotiated with each and every city in particular with the 
aristocratic or princely powers in their surroundings. This implied a great variation 
in the content, which all cities jealously retained restricted to their own sworn 
burghers, until the end of the eighteenth century. 
5. Medieval universities combined the liberty of ecclesiastical institutions with the 
liberties of urban communities. Their statutes, dating from the early thirteenth 
century onwards, guaranteed an independent status ruling out, in principle, lay or 
ecclesiastical interference with the studies. Universities were put under the direct 
authority of the pope, which made it possible to launch path-breaking empirical 
research, especially in the field of surgery. Academic freedom applied in particular 
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 to the masters, the full-fledged members of the scholarly community, while 
students enjoyed only some of the privileges.13  
6. Only under exceptional circumstances of external pressure did the privileged 
cities and territories tend to collaborate in defence of their common freedom. A 
breakthrough towards the territorialisation of liberties was set during the 
revolution of the Low Countries against the Spanish rule in the second half of the 
sixteenth century. Resistance was unified against the increasingly authoritarian 
style of government, directed from the Spanish court. Its most influential 
representatives in the Low Countries were foreigners, imbued in the aristocratic 
mentality of the Catholic reconquista in Spain. That tendency clashed vehemently 
with the long-established urban and regional liberties. The religious cleavage of the 
Reformation brought the ideological justification for the claim to the freedom of 
conscience. The oppression of the tendencies towards protestant orientations, 
which were particularly strong in the larger cities and industrialised regions, 
triggered a revolt, leading to a social revolution, on an unprecedented scale. The 
liberty of thought for free men, as well as the respect for the personal and property 
rights of the privileged communities, where the main themes of this largely 
ideological conflict.14 It eventually led to the ‘liberation’ of the Northern Provinces 
from Spanish rule. In 1581, the States General had formulated an extensively 
motivated declaration to depose King Philip II as lawful prince of the principalities 
in the Low Countries. Its main line of argument was that the king had 
systematically broken his oath to respect the citizen’s liberties, privileges, rights and 
customs.15 
7. The motivation of the 1581 Act of Deposition of Philip II inspired the 
revolutionaries in 1688 in England, and in 1776 those in the North American 
colonies to depose unlawfully ruling kings on behalf of what was now clearly 
labelled as the people’s sovereignty. The latter revolution inspired in its turn the 
French National Assembly to issue in 1789 its ‘Déclaration des droits de l’homme et 
du citoyen’, stating that all men are born and due to remain free and enjoying equal 
rights: 
‘[…]considérant que l’ignorance, l’oubli ou le mépris des droits de l’homme sont les 
seules causes des malheurs publics et de la corruption des Gouvernements, ont 
résolu d’exposer, dans une Déclaration solennelle, les droits naturels, inaliénables 
et sacrés de l’homme, […] 
Article 1. 
Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits. Les distinctions 
sociales ne peuvent être fondées que sur l’utilité commune.’ 
8. In the course of the nineteenth century, most national constitutions would 
confirm these rights, especially the inviolability of the individual person and his 
property, freedom of religion, secrecy of private letters, freedom of the press and of 
association.  
9. The mobilisation of the masses, brought about by the French revolution and the 
revolutionary wars, triggered the sense of national consciousness. This introduced 
the generalisation of nationalistic movements leading either to the unification of 
peoples within a unitary state, as happened in Germany and Italy in the course of 
the nineteenth century, or the the splitting of multinational empires and states into 
nation-states. The movements against foreign rule were felt to be liberations. 
10. A further decisive step towards the recognition of new liberties was the 
recognition, in the beginning of the twentieth century, of universal suffrage for men 
and women. Female voting rights were recognised in Finland as early as 1906, in 
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 Belgium only in 1948, in Spain in 1977. Let us keep in mind how relatively recent 
these acquisitions still are in several Western countries. 
11. In the context of the strife for political rights, social rights have gradually been 
acknowledged, such as the right of education, association, demonstration and 
strike. 
12. Much later again came all kinds of ethical liberties, which had traditionally 
belonged to the competence of churches, such as the liberalisation of sexual 
relations, contraception, abortion and – still widely under discussion – euthanasia. 
If my twelve major steps towards the constant elaboration of the European concept 
of human liberties somehow reflect the increasingly rapid evolution of the scope, 
one will be aware that this process lasted 2500 years. This explains why other 
cultures, whose trajectories have been very different, cannot cope so easily with the 
Human Rights as they have been declared ‘Universal’ in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, under evident dominant Western influence. Central in the 
understanding of the gradual acceptance of ever further reaching liberties, is that 
they always had to be fought for by opposing tendencies and interest groups. They 
are the emanation of countervailing powers which had to learn to settle their 
conflicts peacefully, through regular and open discussion, in the full respect 
otherness. Discretion in the way arguments are put forward, helps to create an 
atmosphere of meaningful deliberation in which each lawful and ethically 
acceptable opinion will finally be settled. 
  
L’amour de la liberté 
For the principles formulated or practiced to be shared by large communities, some 
forms of mass communication were needed, by which the message could be spread 
and internalised rationally as well as by emotionally.
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